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Abstract
Inequality in land ownership remains a major issue in many developing countries, such
as Brazil, Colombia, and South Africa. Donors advocate a new model of “willing-buyer
willing-seller”, market-led land redistribution, but actual redistribution has fallen short of
expectations. Little effort has been made so far to formalize the obstacles to market-led
land redistribution. In this paper, we show that oligopolistic owner-producers may resist
land sales to poorer candidate-buyers not only because they have a lower willingness to
pay for land but also because the entry of poorer entrants threatens tacit collusion.
Keywords: Land reform, Oligopoly.
JEL Classification: Q15, L13.
1 Introduction
Land Gini ratios are still above 0.7 in South Africa, Kenya, Colombia, Brazil, Argentina,
and many more African and Latin American countries. Land reform is therefore as much
as ever on the agenda,1 but the traditional state-led, authoritative model has given way to
decentralised, market-led land reforms (e.g., in Brazil, Colombia, and South Africa), through
which “beneficiaries receive a combination of grants and loans from the public and private
∗Universite´ Paris 2, LEMMA, 5-7 avenue Vavin, 75006, Paris, FRANCE. Email: lucie.menager@u-paris2.fr
†Department of Economics, The University of Sheffield, 9 Mappin Street, Sheffield S1 4DT, U.K. Email:
c.valente@sheffield.ac.uk, Tel: + 44 1 114 222 3421 (Corresponding author)
1As illustrated by the publication in 2003 of a “Land Policies for Growth and Poverty Reduction” report
by the World Bank (Deininger, 2003).
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sectors which they use to negotiate the purchase of land from willing sellers” (World Bank
2006) . The market-led land reform (MLLR) model is however highly controversial among
scholars and policy actors, and the amount of land transferred through these schemes is below
target.
In addition, these programmes have been criticised for not benefiting the poorest (Borras,
2003; Hall et al., 2003). Several authors and actors in the program have identified a resistance
from the behalf of the current landowners related to power relations in the agrarian economy
(Borras 2003; van den Brink et al. 2006, p.41), thus preventing MLLR to achieve actual
land redistribution from the land rich to the land poor. The existing theoretical frameworks
concerned with land redistribution do not deal with market-led land redistribution, but focus
on state-led land redistribution policies.
In the present paper, we seek an explanation of why landowners could refuse land payment
offers emanating from poorer candidate buyers because the entry of the latter would threaten
the current system of joint rent extraction by the owner-producers. More specifically, we show
that, though assuming the two conditions identified by the World Bank (World Bank, 2006)
as the conditions justifying land reform, i.e., (i) credit and insurance constraints weighting
on the poor, and (ii) the existence of unused land and would-be farmers, in sectors where
agricultural producers enjoy a degree of market power, they will discriminate against poorer
candidate land buyers. This is the case because poorer individuals discount the future more
and therefore not only have a lower present value of farm profits (and thus a lower willingness
to pay for the land), but also threaten tacit collusion. The justification for considering the case
of oligopolistic markets is threefold: (1) the highly concentrated pattern of land ownership and
use in many countries concerned with MLLR, (2) the existence of strong farmer organizations
for several sectors in these countries, and (3) the often imperfect transmission of world prices
to local prices, despite the trade liberalization that occurred in most countries in the 1990s
(see Krivonos and Olarreaga, 2006 for sugar cane in Brazil; and Watkinson and Makgetla,
2002, who express concerns that the level of concentration of South African maize producers
“gives rise to concern about price collusion and profiteering”, p.12).
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2 Occurrence of land sales in an oligopolistic agricultural mar-
ket
The agricultural sector is modelled as an oligopolistic market, where n producers compete
in quantity at each period on the output y, in an infinitely repeated game. Producers are all
endowed with the same technology C(y) = cy.2 The inverse demand function is P (y) = α−y,
which we assume to be constant over time. Finally, we denote O the set of oligopolists. We
assume that farmers have the institutional opportunities to form a coalition, e.g. via the rela-
tions developed in sectorial producer organizations. At the collusive equilibrium, each farmer
produces an equal share of the collusive output that maximises their joint profits. Denoting
yCn the quantity of output produced by each farmer and pi
C
n the individual instantaneous profit










If some producer unilaterally deviates from the collusive equilibrium, then he produces the
quantity yDn that maximizes his instantaneous profit, and receives the profit pi
D
n the time he
deviates, with:
yDn =
(α− c)(n + 1)
4n
, piDn =
(n + 1)2(α− c)2
(4n)2
Finally, the quantity produced by each farmer at the Cournot equilibrium and the corre-
sponding individual profit are denoted yNCn and pi
NC









Because of its prisoner dilemma structure, the collusive outcome is not a Nash equilibrium
of the one-shot game. However, if oligopolists agree on the fact that any deviation from
the cooperative strategy triggers a switch to the Cournot equilibrium forever after, then the
collusive outcome at each date is a Nash equilibrium of the repeated game, if producers are
sufficiently patient. 3




2Assuming constant marginal cost is consistent with most existing empirical studies of returns to scale in
agriculture, see for instance Berry and Cline (1979), Sen (1981), Carter (1984), Townsend et al. (1998).
3See Friedman (1971) for the proof.
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∀ i ∈ O, then the collusive outcome at each date is a Nash
equilibrium of the repeated game.
We now look at what happens when a candidate buyer offers to buy an unused land
plot from a producer in different configurations, with respect to the output market outcome,
and according to the buyer’s discount rate. We make the following assumptions: 1) the sale
opportunity is unique, 2) a land plot is enough to produce the Cournot quantity piNCn+1, 3) the
price offered by the seller equals the potential buyer’s willingness to pay, i.e. the seller acts
as a local monopolist on land sales, 4) the potential seller would agree to the sale if and only
if his intertemporal flow of profits in the event of a sale is greater than his intertemporal flow
of profits under the status quo. We make these assumptions to show that, even in the most
favourable case for the seller, land sellers may refuse to sell to would-be buyers if the latter
are too poor.
Let us denote s the potential seller and b the potential buyer of the land plot. There are
three cases according to the initial nature of the competition in the agricultural sector (i.e.
whether ρi ≥ ρ(n) for all i ∈ O or not) and the nature of competition in this market after
the land sale (i.e. whether ρi ≥ ρ(n + 1) for all i ∈ O ∪ {b} or not).
The different cases are summarized in the proposition below.
Proposition 2




Case 2 If ρi ≥ ρ(n) for all i ∈ O, and if ρi < ρ(n + 1) for some i ∈ O ∪ {b}, then the sale




Case 3 If ρi ≥ ρ(n) for all i ∈ O, and if ρi ≥ ρ(n + 1) for all i ∈ O ∪ {b}, then the sale





3 Interpreting the model: conclusions for market-led land re-
form
The discount rate of producer i is assumed to depend positively on i’s perceived probability
that the game will carry on at the next period, and negatively on the interest rate i faces on
the credit market. Due to credit constraints in the credit market, poorer candidate farmers
face a higher interest rate. Due to poorer health or to rationing on insurance markets, they
should also be expected to have a lower perceived probability that the game will continue.
Therefore, poorer farmers should have a lower discount rate, and therefore, a lower ρi. If tacit
collusion is not sustainable before the sale, i.e., if there is some producer i ∈ O such that
ρi < ρ(n), then collusion will not be sustainable either after a land sale to any buyer. The
would-be buyer b’s willingness to pay for the plot is his or her present value of land, namely
ρbpi
NC
n+1. A seller s would agree to the sale to buyer b if pi
NC
n+1(ρs + ρb) > pi
NC
n ρs, i.e., if ρb is
large enough compared to the decrease in future profits due to there having one more player
in the oligopoly game. This is Case 1 of Proposition 2. In this case, the source of preference
for a richer buyer arises simply from the fact that richer individuals have a lower discount
rate and thus a higher willingness to pay. The source of preference is the same in Case 3 of
Proposition 2 where collusion is sustainable both before and after the sale.
In Case 2, there is cooperation in the output market before land transactions, (ρi ≥ ρ(n)
for all i ∈ O) but collusion is not sustainable anymore after the sale, either because some
existing producer i is not patient enough (ρi < ρ(n + 1) for some i ∈ O), or because the
potential buyer b would not sustain the collusion (ρb < ρ(n + 1)). In this case, a seller s
would agree to a sale to buyer b if piNCn+1(ρs + ρb) > pi
C
n ρs. The price must compensate both
the loss of surplus due to the increase in the number of participants, and the loss of profit
due to the breaking of the cartel. Therefore, the threshold for ρb is greater in Case 2 than in
Cases 1 and 3. In particular, a sale will not occur for a candidate buyer who is poorer than
the seller producer. In this case, a stronger form of anti-poor discrimination appears, insofar
as a seller would prefer a richer candidate buyer br even if a poorer would-be buyer bp offered
the equivalent of br’s willingness to pay.
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4 Conclusion
This simple model sheds some light on the redistributive limits of MLLR, based on the
fact that land transfers involve a transfer of much more than the mere land “good”. Assets,
and land in particular, are multifaceted sources of value, leading some authors to even argue
that “land redistribution is essentially power redistribution” Borras (2005, p.93). Though
assuming the two conditions identified by the World Bank as the conditions justifying land
reform, namely: credit and insurance constraints weighting on the poor, and the existence
of unused land and candidate farmers, we show that MLLR is unlikely to create access to
profitable, concentrated commercial agriculture to individuals who are not already well-off,
unless the grants/loans are large enough to drastically reduce the interest rate faced by poorer
farmers, and/or improve their access to insurance, which may prove very costly.
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